Kaifeng Red Foreign-Style Building (Former Site of the KMT-CPC Talks on Restoring the Yellow River’s Original Course)
The Kaifeng Red Foreign-Style Building (Former Site of the KMT-CPC Talks on Restoring the Yellow River’s Original Course) is a national key cultural relics protection unit.
The Red Foreign-Style Building, located within a military compound on Minsheng Street north of the Longhai Railway line in Yuwangtai District, Kaifeng City, is a national key cultural relics protection unit. Its full official name as a national heritage site is: Former Site of the KMT-CPC Talks on Restoring the Yellow River’s Original Course. Currently used by a military unit stationed in Kaifeng.
Built in 1917 with funding from the then Beijing General Post Office, the Red Foreign-Style Building served as the office and residence of the postal director at the time. This two-story Western Baroque-style building, constructed with brick and wood, features a sloped roof and red tiles, facing south. Both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai once stayed here, adding to the prestige of this exquisitely designed Western-style villa.
In June 1938, as Japanese forces advanced into the Central Plains, Chiang Kai-shek, in an attempt to cover his army’s retreat, ordered the breach of the Yellow River levee at Huayuankou north of Zhengzhou. This diverted the river into the Huai, inundating 44 counties and cities across Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces, affecting 12 million people, killing 890,000, and causing a catastrophe that shocked the world. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, with U.S. support, Chiang Kai-shek actively pushed to block the Huayuankou breach and restore the Yellow River’s original course, deploying 400,000 troops in a scheme to “use water as a weapon” to divide and flood the liberated areas.
Under pressure from public outcry, Chiang Kai-shek’s faction agreed to negotiate with the CPC on the timing, procedures, and related matters of restoring the Yellow River’s original course. The first round of talks was held in Kaifeng on April 7, 1946.
On June 9, 1938, as Japanese troops advanced into the Central Plains, Chiang Kai-shek, under the pretext of “stopping the Japanese westward advance,” secretly ordered the New Fifth Army to breach the Yellow River levee at Huayuankou north of Zhengzhou, Henan Province. He intended to use the river as a weapon to block the Japanese forces that had occupied Xuzhou from advancing westward. However, not only did this fail to stop the Japanese offensive, but the diverted waters also broke through the original course, surging southeast into the Huai River and toward the sea. The resulting flood devastated 44 counties and cities across Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, affecting 12.5 million people and killing 890,000, creating a disaster that shocked the world. After Japan’s surrender in 1945, with U.S. backing, Chiang Kai-shek decided to block the Huayuankou breach and restore the Yellow River to its original course. While publicly claiming this was to relieve the suffering of those affected by the flood in the Central Plains, Anhui, and Jiangsu, the real aim was to once again “use water as a weapon” to flood the liberated areas, split the Ji-Lu-Yu Liberated Area downstream of the Yellow River in two, and sever the connections between the North China Liberated Area and the Central Plains and East China Liberated Areas—ultimately aiming to eliminate the liberated areas one by one. This was the so-called “Yellow River strategy” that Chiang Kai-shek boasted could “replace 400,000 troops.”
From 1938 to 1947, the Yellow River flowed southward for nine years. The original course of the Yellow River from Huayuankou to Lijin had 1,200 kilometers of levees, which, after the river changed course, were left unattended for years. Coupled with damage from war and natural erosion, the levees were in ruins. Most of the original course lay within the Ji-Lu-Yu Border Region, where the riverbed and floodplains had been cultivated as farmland, with over 200 new villages established and hundreds of thousands of farmers living there. Diverting the river back into the old course without repairing the levees or properly relocating residents would turn the surrounding communities and floodplain inhabitants into victims of another catastrophic flood. Faced with the malicious actions of Chiang Kai-shek’s faction, the CPC Central Committee, prioritizing the interests of the people in the flood-affected regions of Central Plains, Anhui, and Jiangsu, agreed to let the Yellow River return to its original course but firmly opposed the Nationalist government’s plan to block the breach and release the waters before downstream levees were repaired. The CPC advocated for prioritizing levee repairs, river dredging, and relocating residents before blocking the breach to prevent downstream flooding. It also strongly opposed and exposed Chiang Kai-shek’s scheme to flood the liberated areas. Thus, the KMT and CPC engaged in a series of negotiations and sharp struggles over the issue of restoring the Yellow River’s original course.
I. Brief Process of the Negotiations and Signing of the Agreement. Representatives of the liberated areas’ CPC—Chao Zhefu, Jia Xinzhai, and Zhao Mingfu—and Nationalist representatives—Zhao Shouyu, Wang Huixian, Li Fudu, Chen Ruzhen, Zuo Qipeng, Qu Wenlin, Kong Lingrong, Xu Rui’ao, and Yan Zhenxing—as well as representatives of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)—Ferguson, Treadgold, Zhang Jichun, and Fan Mingde—held talks and initially reached the “Kaifeng Agreement.” Its main points included: 1. Procedures for blocking the breach and repairing the levees. Both actions would proceed simultaneously, but the date for closing the breach at Huayuankou would depend on an assessment of the downstream riverbed’s siltation and damage, as well as the scale of levee repair work required. 2. Construction organization. The agency directly responsible for the blocking and levee repair work should follow the principle of unified cooperation, managed by personnel from both sides. Specific arrangements included: (1) maintaining the existing levee repair and breach-blocking project system; (2) allowing personnel recommended by the CPC side to participate in managing sections within CPC-controlled areas. 3. Resettlement and relief for residents in the riverbed. Relocating and aiding residents in the riverbed was deemed necessary in principle. The Nationalist Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC, hereafter referred to as the YRCC) was to draft a budget for relocating all riverbed residents and submit it to the central government (Nationalist government) for approval, while Director Ma (Ma Jie, head of the Henan Branch of the UNRRA under the Nationalist government’s Executive Yuan’s Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) and Mr. Fan Haining, director of the UNRRA’s Henan regional office, would apply for relief from the UNRRA and the China National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA). Within CPC-controlled areas, CPC representatives would inform local governments to prepare relief efforts. Specific measures would be finalized after on-site inspections. Preliminary discussions and agreements were also made on how the CPC could assist with the project, including labor recruitment, material procurement, transportation, and food distribution for workers. After the signing of the “Kaifeng Agreement,” YRCC Chairman Zhao Shouyu, UNRRA advisor Treadgold, and others departed on April 8 to inspect the downstream areas, accompanied by CPC representatives Zhao Mingfu and Cheng Run.
On April 15, the group returned to the CPC Ji-Lu-Yu Border Region Party Committee’s base in Heze to further discuss the Yellow River issue. Participants included YRCC’s Zhao Shouyu, Tao Shuzeng, Zuo Qipeng, Kong Lingrong, and Xu Rui’ao; Ji-Lu-Yu Administrative Office’s Duan Junyi, Jia Xinzhai, Luo Shigao, Zhao Mingfu, Hua Fu, and Cheng Run; and Bohai Region representative Liu Jiqing. After discussions, the “Heze Agreement” was reached, with key points including: 1. Levee repair, river dredging, and breach-blocking. (a) Water would only be allowed to flow after completing levee repairs, river dredging, straightening bends, and reinforcing dangerous sections. (b) Henan and Hebei provinces would repair existing levees, while Shandong province would first build temporary earthen levees along the southern bank up to Shilibao and the northern bank up to Shouzhang, followed by repairing the existing levees. Below Shilibao, existing levees would be maintained, with any necessary localized straightening determined after surveying. 2. Relief for residents in the riverbed. (a) Each person in newly built villages would receive 100,000 yuan (funds) in relocation compensation from the YRCC, submitted to the Executive Yuan for approval. (b) Relief efforts would be requested from the UNRRA and CNRRA via the YRCC. (c) Liberated area governments would organize mutual aid, resettlement, and job retraining. 3. Construction organization. (a) The flood prevention offices of Hebei and Shandong provinces would have a director and deputy director, with the director appointed by the YRCC and the deputy by the liberated areas. Both sides would report for approval, while surveying and construction would proceed in advance. The Henan levee repair office would follow the same organizational principles as Hebei and Shandong. (b) CPC-affiliated personnel participating at all levels would follow the principles agreed upon at the Kaifeng meeting. 4. Transportation. Essential transportation routes for construction would be restored gradually based on needs but would not be used for military purposes, with local governments maintaining order. 5. Currency. The YRCC would consult with liberated area governments to determine currency-related issues. Shortly after the “Heze Agreement” was signed, on April 17, the Nationalist Central News Agency announced that “the breach-blocking and levee repair would be completed within two months.” On April 20, the Nationalist Central Daily News reported, “If the breach-blocking is not fully completed before the flood season, the government cannot take full responsibility.” Soon after, the YRCC technical team’s proposal to postpone the breach-blocking until after the flood season was rejected by Executive Yuan head Song Ziwen. Meanwhile, senior Nationalist generals visited Huayuankou to “inspect” and “observe,” boosting morale for accelerating the breach-blocking. In response, on May 5, Xinhua News Agency published a statement from the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Border Region Government, accusing the Nationalists of planning to breach the levee within two months “with clear military intent, intentionally directing the YRCC to flood residents along the rivers in Hebei and Shandong,” and demanding the Nationalist authorities “immediately halt the Huayuankou breach-blocking project and firmly oppose the two-month timeline.” It concluded that “if the authorities disregard lives, the people will have no choice but to defend themselves, and the Nationalist authorities will bear full responsibility for the severe consequences.” On May 10, a CPC Central Committee spokesperson stated, “We firmly oppose the Nationalists’ sinister plan to deliberately flood our liberated areas, call on people at home and abroad to uphold justice, halt the Huayuankou breach-blocking project, and fully implement the Heze Agreement.”
Given the risk of the Nationalist government completely reneging on the Heze Agreement, CPC representatives Zhao Mingfu, Wang Xiaoyi, and Cheng Run further discussed implementing the agreement with Treadgold and Zhang Jichun on May 8. On May 15, Zhao Mingfu and Wang Xiaoyi traveled to Nanjing with Fan Haining, director of the UNRRA’s Henan regional office. Upon arrival, they first received instructions from CPC Central Committee representative Zhou Enlai and, accompanied by him, held discussions with YRCC Director Xue Dubi. On the morning of May 18, representatives from the CPC, UNRRA, CNRRA, YRCC, YRCC Flood Control Bureau, and Breach-Blocking Bureau—including Zhao Mingfu, Wang Xiaoyi, Tao Shuzeng, Yang Naijun, Xu Kai, Yan Zhenxing, Guo Xuan, Li Jiachen, Zhu Guangcai, and Zhang Jichun—held detailed discussions and reached the “Nanjing Agreement.” Its contents included: 1. Levee repair projects. (1) Urgent downstream levee repairs, including reinforcing dangerous sections and partially straightening the river channel, would be prioritized, while planning for the entire project would proceed in coordination. (2) Materials and food for workers needed for urgent projects would be promptly supplied by the CNRRA and UNRRA. (3) Funding for urgent projects would be fully allocated by the YRCC. (4) These levee repair works would aim to start before June 5. (5) Technical aspects of the levee repairs would be coordinated by the YRCC, with work within CPC-controlled areas managed by the CPC. 2. Resettlement and relief for residents in the downstream river channel. The YRCC had already submitted a proposal to the central government, which was urged to expedite approval to align with the needs of the breach-blocking and levee repair projects. 3. The breach-blocking project would continue, with the principle of preventing downstream flooding. The CPC representatives proposed a reservation: driving piles and throwing stones before the main flood season should not exceed two meters below the riverbed, subject to: (1) no military or political interference; (2) the Bianxin Railway and highway not being dismantled for now; (3) CPC engineers stationed at Huayuankou for close coordination. On May 18, CPC Central Committee representative Zhou Enlai also reached six verbal agreements with Frank W. Lockhart, acting director of the UNRRA’s China branch, and YRCC engineering advisor Treadgold: (1) Downstream levee repairs and river dredging should overcome all difficulties and proceed swiftly. (2) All materials and food needed for the projects would be supplied by the UNRRA and CNRRA, free from military or political interference. (3) The UNRRA would establish an office in Heze to handle material supply, with CPC participation. (4) A tripartite committee (two government representatives, two CPC representatives, one UNRRA representative, and one CNRRA representative) would manage relief for relocated riverbed residents. (5) No excavation of diversion channels or dismantling of the Bianxin Railway or highway below Huayuankou before June 15, unless agreed upon by both sides based on downstream progress by then. (6) Pile-driving would continue, but stone-throwing would be decided by June 15 based on downstream progress, with a limit of two meters below the riverbed if approved. The principle of preventing downstream flooding would apply to all mentioned downstream project progress.
As the Nationalist government focused solely on breach-blocking while delaying the allocation of funds for levee repairs and resident relocation as stipulated in the agreements, Zhou Enlai personally convened further talks with relevant representatives in Shanghai from July 18 to 22, ultimately reaching the “Shanghai Agreement.” In addition to these four major negotiations, three smaller meetings were held: the Zhangqiu talks on December 9, 1946; the Handan talks on January 3, 1947; and the Dongming talks on June 4, 1947.
II. The Nationalists Rip Up the Agreement and Prematurely Block the Breach
From January 14, 1946, when Nationalist representatives entered the liberated areas, to May 17, 1947, when the Nationalists expelled CPC representatives from the YRCC, a period of one year and five months passed. Despite multiple talks and signed agreements, the Nationalist authorities proved utterly insincere. Restoring the Yellow River’s original course was an immensely complex task, requiring levee repairs, dam reinforcement, and relocating riverbed residents—all of which needed time and could not be completed in mere months. Yet, the Nationalists had long set their sights on completing the Huayuankou breach-blocking before the 1946 flood season. On March 1, 1946, they unilaterally began breach-blocking without notifying the liberated areas. On April 28, Bai Chongxi, deputy chief of the Nationalist Defense Ministry’s General Staff, personally supervised the construction. Just three days after the Nanjing Agreement was signed, stone-throwing at Huayuankou began, along with preparations to excavate diversion channels, dismantle the Bianxin Railway and highway, and proceed with breach-blocking. On June 29, due to a sudden rise in the Yellow River’s water level, bridge piles for the breach-blocking were damaged, forcing the project to be postponed until after the flood season. To launch an offensive against the liberated areas, Chiang Kai-shek planned to use the Yellow River as a defensive line to block the Liu-Deng armies north of the river, making the restoration of Huayuankou even more urgent. Disregarding all prior agreements, Chiang Kai-shek issued ruthless orders such as “halt military transport if necessary, but never river transport” and “complete the task by the deadline, or face execution.” Senior Nationalist officials, including Xue Dubi, Chen Cheng, and Gu Zhutong, repeatedly visited the Huayuankou site to oversee construction. Finally, on March 15, 1947, they brazenly blocked the Huayuankou breach, allowing the Yellow River to flow into the liberated areas’ original course. According to incomplete statistics at the time, just in the 10 counties along the river in the Ji-Lu-Yu Liberated Area, 237 villages were flooded, over 270,000 acres of farmland submerged, and vast populations were left homeless.
From early 1946 to summer 1947, the CPC’s struggle with the Nationalist authorities over restoring the Yellow River’s original course delayed the breach-blocking, bought time for downstream levee repairs, protected the lives and property of people on both banks of the Yellow River, and thwarted the Chiang Kai-shek clique’s scheme to flood the liberated areas.
In May 2013, the State Council (State Council Document [2013] No. 13) designated the Kaifeng Red Foreign-Style Building (Former Site of the KMT-CPC Talks on Restoring the Yellow River’s Original Course) as part of the seventh batch of national key cultural relics protection units.
Further Reading:
· Third Batch of Henan Provincial Cultural Relics Protection Units
· Seventh Batch of National Key Cultural Relics Protection Units
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