It has become imperative to rectify the skiing industry; we cannot simply let the market eliminate players naturally.

       The impact of these "small ski workshops" goes beyond just tarnishing the collective reputation of Harbin’s ski resorts; it also undermines industry standards.

       Guo Peng, general manager of Pingshan Shenlu Ski Resort, said that while the number of skiers is increasing and their spending awareness is growing year by year, most skiers still look for price support. Some small ski workshops offer deals like "a full day of skiing for 15 yuan, including lunch," which legitimate ski resorts simply cannot compete with, leading to a gradual erosion of their survival base. Taking Pingshan Shenlu Ski Resort as an example, nearby small workshops divert 40,000 to 50,000 visitors away from it every year.

       "What exactly qualifies as a ski resort?" After operating for over a decade, several long-established ski resorts in the city have begun to question something that should never have been in doubt: a place with over ten ski runs can be called a ski resort, but so can a small workshop with just one informal, substandard slope. By this logic, Zhu Xiaohu, president of Longzhu Ski Group, who was involved in setting the local S-grade ski resort standards, estimates there are at least 60 "ski resorts" in Harbin and its surrounding areas.

       In reality, building a ski resort requires substantial capital investment. According to local industry standards formulated by the provincial tourism bureau and the provincial bureau of technical supervision in 2001 and revised in 2004, ski resorts must meet 11 specific requirements regarding slope facilities and equipment. These include slope length, cable car construction, snowmaking systems, snow grooming machinery, slope maintenance, and on-mountain rescue services. For instance, Yawangsi Ski Resort had an investment of 320 million yuan, while Jihua Ski Resort’s investment also exceeded 300 million yuan.

       The proliferation of small ski workshops has almost completely reshaped visitors' understanding of what a ski resort is. These small operations can open their doors to customers without adhering to any industry standards, competing for the same market share as legitimate ski resorts.

       Chuo Pengqun, director of Mao’ershan Ski Resort at Harbin Institute of Physical Education, feels that large ski resorts are at a complete disadvantage when competing for tourist traffic. "Large ski resorts have strict financial management systems and set standardized commission rates for travel agencies, unlike 'small workshops' which have much more flexibility. As a result, it's very hard for large ski resorts to attract travel agencies."

       Chuo Pengqun’s viewpoint resonated within the industry. Guo Peng said that larger ski resorts with bigger investments are actually losing out to smaller ones. A few years ago, before these small ski resorts emerged, Harbin’s ski market was relatively well-regulated, and ski resorts were doing fairly well. But after the small workshops appeared, relying on travel agencies, they siphoned off a large portion of the customer base. Although each small ski resort has limited capacity, their sheer number means that the hardware and software advantages of larger resorts cannot be fully utilized, and ski tourism traffic is gradually being eroded by them.

       "The surge of small ski workshops has made price undercutting the norm across the industry," said Zhu Xiaohu. "We have no way to tell tourists which are the legitimate ski resorts, so we can only try to win back some customers by lowering prices." Guo Peng echoed this sentiment: "In the past, when setting prices, all the major ski resorts followed industry rules and didn’t arbitrarily raise or lower prices. But with the disruption caused by the small ski resorts, adjusting prices based on customer volume has become the norm. 'This Spring Festival, the fact that we didn’t raise prices actually became a highlight that attracted tourists. That should have been standard practice, yet now it’s seen as some kind of outstanding achievement—isn’t that ridiculous?'"

       An anonymous official from Heilongjiang Provincial Tourism Bureau commented on the current state of Harbin’s ski resorts: "Most are not doing well, mainly because they’ve been disrupted by the small ski resorts."

       Who should be in charge of ski resorts? No one seems to know. As a result, no single department has a clear picture of how many ski resorts are currently in operation. Industry insiders generally estimate there are dozens of small ski workshops.

       "Industry management falls under the tourism department, but only for S-grade ski resorts. The approval process isn’t handled by the tourism bureau," said an official from the provincial tourism bureau. Similar to this, sports and forestry departments each manage only certain aspects of ski resorts.

       "This situation directly leads to some ski resorts opening without the relevant management authorities even knowing they exist," an industry insider explained. Some individually operated small ski resorts don’t even have licenses—not to mention being regulated, they can’t even guarantee the personal safety of visitors.

       The issue with ski resorts isn’t just low barriers to entry—it’s that there are virtually no barriers at all. Anyone who wants to can start one. This official said that such small ski resorts only come to the attention of relevant departments when customer complaints arise. For example, in cases of tourism disputes, the tourism department steps in from a management perspective; for issues related to instructor quality, the sports department manages practitioners based on qualifications. But even without any approvals, a ski resort can enter the market freely, and the corresponding management departments have no clear indicators or mandatory requirements to "shut down" such a venue. "So far, I haven’t heard of any ski resort being officially ordered to exit the market."

       The absence of entry and exit systems makes it difficult to ensure the quality of practitioners. When interviewing Zhu Xiaohu, he was looking into a media report about ski instructors demanding tips. He said the report reflected two major problems in Harbin’s ski market: first, the term "Yabuli Ski Resort" is used by any small ski operation in or around Yabuli Town, but out-of-town visitors don’t know this and assume it’s the best Yabuli Ski Resort in Harbin; second, the quality of ski resort staff varies widely.

       During the interviews, reporters found that even operators of some large ski resorts couldn’t clearly explain whether there are industry standards for ski resort personnel, describing the situation as "possibly lacking." They felt that many small ski workshops haven’t even gone through proper approvals, so it’s impossible to talk about the professional quality of their staff—let alone meeting any "high" standards.

       "The ski resort industry in Harbin is developing in a chaotic and disorganized manner." This statement was repeated countless times during the reporter’s interviews over several days.
       "Inherent shortcomings"—all the previously overlooked issues are now causing trouble

       From the 1996 Asian Winter Games to the 2009 Universiade, Harbin’s ski industry experienced rapid growth thanks to these major events. In the minds of domestic travelers, "skiing in Harbin" became the ultimate aspiration for skiing, as it was seen as the most "authentic" and "prestigious." The ski industry boosted by these events entered a "golden period" of development. Industry insiders recalled: "Every ski resort was doing extremely well."

       It was precisely during this period of market euphoria from rapid growth that Harbin’s inherent shortcomings in the ski industry were ignored.

       "First is the climate issue." Officials from the sports department explained that because Harbin’s weather is extremely cold, the snow has less moisture content and is drier. While this isn’t a problem for recreational skiing, it may not provide the best "feel" for professional enthusiasts. For this reason, ski resorts in Beijing and Hebei have been able to attract and retain nearby skiing enthusiasts. Harbin lacks this inherent advantage, so enthusiasts from farther away are unlikely to make the trip.

       When the ski market begins to "struggle during peak season," all these inherent shortcomings start to cause trouble. For example, the high cost of accommodation in Harbin.

       An official from Heilongjiang Provincial Tourism Bureau said that the cost of accommodation in Harbin is relatively high, and just in this respect, the competitiveness of tourism skiing is inferior to that of Jilin.

       The reporter’s research confirmed this claim. Checking online hotel prices in Harbin, taking the 5-star Shangri-La Hotel as an example, bookings via Qunar.com show it is about 400 yuan more expensive per night than similar hotels in Changchun. For economy chain hotels like Home Inn, prices in Changchun are all below 200 yuan per night, while in Harbin they are all above 200 yuan.

       "Hotels in Harbin are the most expensive in the three northeastern provinces, and there are also relatively few 5-star hotels," said Liu Yichun, planning manager at Longzhu Erlongshan Ski Resort, also mentioning the overall competitiveness of Harbin tourism. The industry generally believes that Harbin’s overall tourism competitiveness also constrains the development of its ski industry. Skiing is part of the broader ice and snow industry and tourism sector. Resorts like Beijing’s Lotus Mountain and Hebei’s Wanlong Ski Resort are doing well because they are supported by other nearby tourist attractions in Beijing.

       Inherent shortcomings are compounded by insufficient "later-stage" efforts. "Which mountains around Harbin are actually suitable for ski resorts? How many ski resorts should Harbin have?" said Liu Yichun. Unfortunately, no one has studied this issue, resulting in an oversaturated number of ski resorts in Harbin. The surrounding cities and counties all want to promote their own ski industries without unified planning. There is also a lack of proper distribution and staggered offerings among high-, medium-, and low-end ski resorts, leading to severe homogeneous competition.

       "Ski workshops that do not meet local standards or industry regulations should be shut down through administrative measures," Zhu Xiaohu believes. Given the current chaotic situation at Harbin ski resorts, the market can no longer be left to "natural selection" or allowed to survive or perish on its own. It would be best for the relevant authorities to step in and regulate the industry.

       Chu Pengqun, a professor from the Harbin Institute of Physical Education, also hopes: "Can the relevant departments, or even the media, gather the ski resort operators together, consolidate the issues, and collectively analyze how to solve them?"

       Ski resort operators are looking for government support. Some industry insiders mentioned: "The ski industry is still an emerging sector. For ski resorts, the relevant departments should not only help them get started but also support them along the way." Guo Peng also hopes that the tourism department will regulate the industry from the perspective of tourism standards, the sports department will enhance the professionalism of ski instructors, and the forestry department will oversee the approval of ski resort land use—so as to streamline all ski resorts in the city and guide the development of the ski industry onto the "right track."

       The provincial tourism bureau has been conducting research on ski resorts across the province since last year and concluded that ski resorts "indeed need regulation."

       Some operators who are currently "struggling" in the ski industry have more specific ideas. Zhu Xiaohu proposed an "official recommendation system." He said that even if, for various reasons, small ski workshops cannot be quickly shut down, the relevant departments could adopt a more feasible approach to regulate the industry. For example, tourism, sports, and other departments could evaluate ski resorts that meet local industry standards and pass re-evaluations using a strict rating system, then publish a list of "officially recommended" resorts on websites such as those of the Harbin government and tourism authorities. These recommendations could also be featured in CCTV advertisements promoting city tourism.

       "Tourists still trust government recommendations," Zhu Xiaohu said, because consumers will consider "what qualifies this ski resort for official recommendation," which in turn influences their choices. Moreover, such recommendations should cater to different customers' varying needs in terms of professionalism and pricing, providing targeted suggestions so that tourists can easily find ski resorts that match their own conditions.
       During interviews, industry insiders also specifically told reporters that contrary to common misconceptions, this year's "lack of snow" weather has actually had very little impact on the Harbin ski tourism industry. Ski resorts rely primarily on artificial snowmaking regardless of natural snowfall. Staff at Jihua Ski Resort said that this year, 18 snowmaking machines have been running day and night to produce snow. The "feel" of artificial snow differs from that of natural snow—competitive skiing requires natural snow, but tourist skiing relies on artificial snow. Even when there is natural snowfall, artificial snow is laid on top. Therefore, even Harbin, which occasionally experiences less snow, will not diminish its appeal for ski tourism.

       Searching "Harbin ski" on Baidu yields over 5 million results, far more than any other region in China.

       During interviews, both industry insiders and government officials mentioned that the reason they take the current issues in Harbin's ski industry so seriously is because "we cherish it too much." The Harbin ski market is the earliest-developed, fastest-growing, and largest ski tourism market in China. "Having skied in Harbin" remains a source of pride for some domestic travelers. We have a first-mover advantage, rich practical experience, and the influence accumulated over 15 years since 1996. If the current problems can be resolved promptly, the Harbin ski industry will go "faster and farther."

       "To cherish this industry, we must correct every issue as soon as it arises," said Li Bin, a relevant person in charge at Jihua Ski Resort. We cannot rest on our "throne," assuming the market is so vast that losing a bit to others doesn't matter. Perhaps we don’t care about a few tens of thousands of visitors, but ski resorts in cities like Changchun and Shenyang have been carefully studying the Harbin ski market, gradually siphoning off tens of thousands of visitors from us every year to build up their own strengths. The ski industry is a sunrise industry, and we should address the current bottlenecks in development and win back the visitors we've lost.

       Zhu Xiaohu said that, based on the current foundation, for Harbin to maintain its leading position in the national ice and snow tourism industry, the ski industry needs integration. For instance, Yabuli can host large-scale continental competitions, which is the greatest strength of Harbin’s ski industry development—it conveys an impression of being "professional" and "authentic." To advance to the next level, the seven ski resorts currently in Yabuli need to be integrated, ideally attracting major investors through this consolidation. Zhu Xiaohu said: "It’s like slapping someone with your palm—it doesn’t hurt much—but when you clench your hand into a fist, the punch has power."

       Placing high hopes on rectification and integration is meant to ensure the continuity and advancement of Harbin’s ski industry advantages. By tidying up the "ski runs" and polishing the "crown," facing challenges head-on, the Harbin ski industry certainly should have the boldness to rightfully hold its position as the industry leader, but it must also have the wisdom to achieve this goal.